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Abstract Both experimental and empirical studies have shown that democratically
imposing a policy that encourages cooperation may increase its effectiveness by
enhancing the voters’ cooperation behavior. But, do those involved in the demo-
cratic decision-making process change their behavior when facedwith an exogenously
implemented rule? This paper experimentally shows that the voters that are involved
in a successful democratic selection of a policy behave more pro-socially as consistent
with recent studies. My experiment moreover shows that such a successful democratic
imposition of the policy may increase the voters’ level of cooperation even when the
policy is undemocratically imposed.
I am grateful to Pedro Dal Bó for invaluable guidance, discussions, encouragement, and making NSF
grant SES-0720753 available for this experiment. I am also grateful to Louis Putterman for continuous
advice, discussions and constant support, and to Brian Knight for insightful suggestions and discussions,
and seminar audiences at Brown University, George Mason University, University of Vienna, the 81st
Annual Meetings of the Southern Economic Association and 2011 Annual International Meeting of the
Economic Science Association for helpful suggestions. I thank Urs Fischbacher for sharing his z-tree file
used in Falk et al. (2013) with me. I thank the editor, Maggie Penn, and two anonymous referees for their
helpful comments.
Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s00355-016-0967-y)
contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
B Kenju Kamei
kenju.kamei@gmail.com; kenju.kamei@durham.ac.uk




Democratic decision processes, in which rules are collectively selected by voting,
are used in most societies and organizations today. Both empirical and experimental
research suggests that the process by which a policy is implemented may change its
outcome by affecting people’s level of cooperation on the relevant voted issue through
various channels. There are three effects, among others, that democratic processes
are known to have: the effects of a selection bias through the endogenous processes
(i.e., selection effects), the effects of signals sent through the voting processes, and the
democracy premium, which is an effect directly influencing people’s behavior (i.e, the
residual that cannot be explained by the selection or signaling effects). The literature
suggests that the third residual effect may be non-negligible (e.g., Bardhan 2000; Dal
Bó et al. 2010; Frey 1997; Sutter et al. 2010, and Tyran and Feld 2006).1 Especially,
Dal Bó et al. (2010) and Tyran and Feld (2006) find that the democracy premium may
be substantial when a policy that can resolve or mitigate a problem is successfully
implemented democratically.
Another possible effect that democratic policy selections may have, related to
the democracy premium, is changing people’s behavior outside the democratic envi-
ronment. There is large literature on spill-over or transfer of institutional effects on
people’s behavior from perspectives of other behavioral theories. First, according to
the behavioral game theory, there is the so-called behavioral spill-over phenomenon.
This refers to the situation where subjects’ decisions in an environment can be influ-
enced by their own other decisions made in different environments (e.g., Bednar et al.
2012; Cason et al. 2012).
Second, other studies have demonstrated that the negative effect of the use of
monetary incentives in a task—motivation crowding-out—can be transferred to areas
indirectly related to the incentivized task such as tasks without it (e.g., Frey 1993;
Frey and Benz 2001; Osterloh and Frey 2000; Frey and Jegen 2001).2
An indirect institutional effect in the context of democratic decision-making would
be one that changes the voters’ behavior as a policy intends to even when the pol-
icy is undemocratically imposed, if they have experienced a successful democratic
implementation of a policy in one area. This is a transfer of motivation crowding-in.
For example, imagine a situation where students collectively imposed a No Smoking
Policy, an ordinance whose violation is not punishable, into your school by voting.
In this example, the students might be more likely to comply with the No Smoking
Policy, compared with when the university exogenously imposed it without reflecting
their votes or voices; but not only that, they might also become more likely to com-
ply with the No Smoking Policy in public libraries where the rule was autocratically
implemented if intrinsic motivations are crowded in among the students.
Apart from these behavioral or institutional theories, income inequality-averse
models, such as the prominent Fehr and Schmidt (1999), also predict such posi-
tive spill-over effects. Suppose that an inequality-averse person sees that her group
1 See Dal Bó (2010) for a summary of experimental evidence.
2 Also see Gneezy and Rustichini (2000).
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collectively imposed a policy by voting. Suppose also that she expects that her
group members are more likely to respond to the incentive change and behave more
cooperatively because it was democratically chosen; and that accordingly mutual
cooperation would be more easily attained. In this circumstance, she may raise her
compliance, that is, increase her level of cooperation, also in her other group where
a policy is autocratically imposed, as her income inequality with the others in the
undemocratic environment would increase otherwise. Despite its possibility, such a
spill-over effect on the voters’ behavior has not received attention in experimental
research.
We conduct a laboratory experiment in order to explore a possibility of a spill-
over effect on the voters’ behavior triggered by democratic decision-making. The
specific question asked in this paper is: Does succeeding in democratically imposing
a non-deterrent sanction policy in a cooperation dilemma raise the voters’ level of
cooperation even with an undemocratically imposed policy?
Our experiment is based on the framework of a standard linear public goods game.
The key design feature is that each subject belongs to two groups with distinct partners
and simultaneously plays twopublic goods games. Each subject is given a fixed endow-
ment for each group and makes an allocation decision between the private account and
the public account in that group. Experimental parameters are set so that contributing
zero points to the public account in each group is privately optimal, but full contribu-
tion is socially optimal. In this environment, a non-deterrent sanction policy may be
imposed in each of their two groups. The non-deterrent sanction policy just mitigates
the incentive to defect in social dilemmas without altering equilibria for selfish players
(e.g., Tyran and Feld 2006). Thus, the mutual full free-riding remains the unique equi-
librium in the game even after the policy has been implemented. The setup that the two
games are simultaneously played is selected as our focus is not on how people’s expe-
riences in cooperation dilemmas under the democracy regime influence their future
contribution behavior under undemocratic regimes, but on the presence of democracy
premiums. In other words, excluding reputation effects is desirable. For some subjects,
a non-deterrent sanction policy is selected democratically in one group, and it is unde-
mocratically imposed by the computer in their other group. We treat these subjects
as treatment subjects. For other subjects, the policy is undemocratically imposed by
the computer in both of their two assigned groups. We treat these subjects as control
subjects. In this paper, we call a group in which the implementation decision is demo-
cratically made the “democratic group”, irrespective of whether the policy is imposed
or not. Likewise, we call a group in which the decision is undemocratically made the
“undemocratic group”.
Our experiment indicates that when the non-deterrent sanction policy is democrati-
cally imposed in a group, subjects who support the policy contribute to the democratic
group significantly more than the subjects with the same preference that have never
undergone the democratic change. In addition, the former treatment subjects con-
tribute to their undemocratic groups in which the policy is also imposed significantly
more, compared with the latter control subjects. This suggests that the democracy
premium may be significantly larger than the literature have suggested by the amount
of the spill-over effect. By contrast, we find that on average, neither the direct nor
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spill-over effect of democracy is substantial among the opponents of the non-deterrent
penalty.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 provides the experimental
design. Section 3 reports results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Experimental design
The experiment has two periods. In each period, subjects play two public goods games,
each of which has a group size of two (Sect. 2.1).3 At the onset of the experiment, each
subject is randomly assigned to two groups of two individuals. To prevent repeated
encounters, regardless of their decisions in Period 1, each subject is randomly assigned
to two new groups each with a new different individual in Period 2. In other words, we
employ the perfect stranger matching protocol. In the second period, a policy may be
imposed either democratically or undemocratically in the public goods game (Sect.
2.2.3).
When we measure the democracy premiums, we control for selection effects.
Controlling for selection effects is important because subjects’ voting decisions and
subsequent actions in a game may be correlated with unobservable factors. We apply
the method proposed by Dal Bó et al. (2010) to our experiment in order to control for
the selection effects. Specifically, all subjects make voting decisions and after that, the
computer stochastically assigns either democratic or undemocratic implementation
conditions to their groups (Sects. 2.2.1 and 2.2.2). As discussed in Sect. 1, the effects
of the democratic process in the voted agenda are composed of (a) selection effects,
(b) signaling effects, and (c) the democracy premium. In this paper, we use the term
“direct effect of democracy” to refer to effect (c). We use the term “spill-over effect of
democracy” to refer to the effect of a person’s experience of the successful democratic
imposition of a policy on her level of contribution with an undemocratically imposed
policy. This is another possible democracy premium. We refer to these two democ-
racy premiums together as the “effects of democracy”. The effects of democracy are
measured based on subjects’ contribution amounts in Period 2.
After Period 2, all subjects take the cognitive reflection test (CRT), and participate in
a beauty contest game.4 Subsequently, they answer a questionnaire of demographics
such as gender (female or male). The CRT scores, beauty contest game responses
and the demographic data are used as control variables in analysis. Every participant
privately receives payment immediately after the experiment. A schematic diagram of
the experiment is included in Fig. 1.5
3 We use the minimum group size to obtain the adequate number of independent observations.
4 The CRT consists of three questions. A subject earns seven points for each correct response to the three
questions. See Frederick (2005) for the details. In the beauty contest game, each subject chooses an integer
between 0 and 100. The subject with the closest number to two thirds of the average of all numbers in a
session earns 120 points. See Nagel (1995).
5 Subjects are asked to answer a few comprehension questions to check their understanding of the experi-
ment before the start of the experiment (see online Appendix A for the instructions).
123
Democracy and resilient pro-social behavioral. . . 363
Period 1






Stage 2: the contribution 
stage
Two public goods 
games with or w/o 
non-deterrent sanctions 
in each group.
- Instructions  for Period 2 
- Group composition changes 
(Perfect stranger matching)
“Dem” condition:  













assigned in each 
group
Voting decision 
in each of their 
two assigned 
groups (group 1, 
group 2)
Fig. 1 Schematic diagram of the experiment
2.1 Period one
Period 1 plays a role in familiarizing subjects with the voluntary contribution dilemma
before their voting decisions. In this period, each subject is given an endowment of 20
points (6 points= $1 in the experiment) in each of their two assigned groups. Subjects
then decide how to allocate their 20 points between a private account and a public
account in each group. Only integers between 0 and 20 are allowed for this purpose.
The marginal per capita return (MPCR) from the public account equals 0.6 in each






20 − Ci,k + .6 · (Ci,k + Ci ′ s partner,k)
]
, (1)
where Ci,k is the contribution amount of subject i in the kth group (k = 1 or 2)
andCi ′ s partner,k is the contribution amount of the subject i’s counterpart in the kth
group.
Subjects are informedof their counterparts’ allocation amounts to the public account
and of their own payoffs at the end of Period 1.
2.2 Period two
Our focus in this study is on subjects’ contribution behaviors in this period. Period 2
consists of a voting stage followed by a contribution stage.
2.2.1 The voting stage
The voting stage proceeds as follows. At the beginning of Period 2, each subject votes
on whether to employ a non-deterrent sanction policy in each of their two assigned
123
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groups separately (see Sect. 2.2.3 for the details of the policy). Each individual votes
twice as they belong to two distinct groups. We refer to our subjects as follows: “Yes-
Yes voters” are those who supported the policy in both of their two assigned groups,
“No-No voters” are those who voted against it in both of their two assigned groups,
and “Yes-No voters” are those who voted in favor of the policy in one group and
against it in the other.
Once every subject votes, the computer stochastically assigns a democratic con-
dition to one of their two assigned groups. The fraction of subjects to which the
democratic condition is assigned is two-thirds.6 For these two-thirds of the subjects,
irrespective of their votes, the computer stochastically imposes the non-deterrent pol-
icy in the other of their two groups. As for the remaining one-third of the subjects,
the computer stochastically imposes the policy without reflecting their votes in both
of their two assigned groups.
The implementation procedure is as follows: if the democratic condition is given
in a group, the computer counts subjects’ votes and the majority determines whether
to impose the policy in that group. When one person votes for the policy but the
other votes against it, the computer stochastically breaks the tie. If the undemocratic
condition is assigned to a group, the computer does not consider their votes and just
stochastically decides whether to impose the policy (subjects are informed that in this
case their votes will not be considered and it is subject to the computer’s stochastic
choice). We set the probability with which the policy is imposed as follows: under the
undemocratic condition, orwhen the vote share is 50%under the democratic condition,
the computer will implement the sanction policy with a probability of 90 %.7
We use the following notation: “Dem” (abbreviated from Democratic Decision-
Making) indicates that a majority rule determined whether to impose the policy.
“Comp” (abbreviated fromComputer) means that the computer stochastically decided
it without considering subjects’ votes. “Imp” means that the policy was imposed. In
this paper, we focus on the following two implementation outcomes: “Dem Imp, Comp
Imp” (treatment condition) and “Comp Imp, Comp Imp” (control condition).8 Here,
“Dem Imp, Comp Imp” reads that for a subject, the non-deterrent policy was imposed
in one group reflecting her vote, whereas it was also imposed in her other group as
a result of the computer’s stochastic choice. “Comp Imp, Comp Imp” reads that the
policy was imposed in each of her two assigned groups as a result of the computer’s
stochastic choice without reflecting her votes (Fig. 2).
6 In the experiment, three groups (three subjects in total) are linked with each other, forming a triad.
The democratic condition is randomly assigned to one group in each triad (the undemocratic condition is
randomly assigned to two groups in each triad).
7 This probability was chosen as the aim of our study is to compare people’s compliance with the policy
between the two implementation processes. This kind of adjustment in probability was also employed in
other studies for their research purposes (e.g., Dal Bó et al. 2010).
8 We note that there are seven pairs of possible implementation outcomes for each subject as they belong
to two distinct groups. Referring to the situation where the policy was not imposed as “Not,” the other five
possible implementation outcomes are “Dem Imp, Comp Not,” “Dem Not, Comp Imp,” “Dem Not, Comp
Not,” “Comp Imp, Comp Not,” and “Comp Not, Comp Not.” Data on these five implementation outcomes
is a by-product and is not used for this study.
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Treatment Subjects
Dem Imp Comp Imp
Control Subjects
Comp Imp Comp Imp
Fig. 2 Treatment subjects and control subjects. Each subject belongs to two distinct groups. Gray circles
( ) indicate two distinct counterparts of treatment and control subjects
2.2.2 Information feedback after the voting stage
Under the democratic condition, each subject obtains partial information about the
vote of her counterpart as their votes determine the imposition of the sanction pol-
icy. For instance, suppose that a subject voted against the policy, but the policy was
democratically imposed in that group. In this case, she would become aware that her
counterpart voted in favor of the policy. If we assume that a subjectmay develop beliefs
about her partner’s future cooperation based on the partial information, the difference
in the quantity of information between “Dem Imp, Comp Imp” and “Comp Imp, Comp
Imp” may become a problem as her contribution behavior may be affected by such
beliefs. For this reason, we make this partial information available also to subjects in
the undemocratic condition followingDal Bó et al. (2010) tomitigate signaling effects.
The procedure is as follows: all subjects, regardless of whether they are in demo-
cratic or undemocratic groups, are informed of whether “at most one person”, or “at
least one person” voted for the policy in each of their two assigned groups (we refer to
the former as the “information At-Most”, and the latter as the “information At-Least”
in the paper). When the vote share in a group is 50 %, the group members receive the
Information At-Least and At-Most each with a probability of 50 %. Theoretically, the
quantity of the information At-Least received by subjects is only slightly higher in the
“Dem Imp” condition than in the “Comp Imp” condition because of the adjustment in
probability mentioned in Sect. 2.2.1.9
9 As explained, each subject is randomly assigned to groups in Period 2. Thus, theoretically, whether one is
in a democratic group or an undemocratic group, the probability with which a Yes-Yes voter is paired with
another Yes-Yes voter or a Yes-No voter is the same. Therefore, for a Yes-Yes voter, regardless of the imple-
mentation processes, the probability with which the policy is implemented is almost the same: while it is
90% in an undemocratic group, it is 94.7% in a democratic group. Here, the latter probability was calculated
by using the ex-post probabilities (Appendix Table B.1) based on the distribution of actual votes as follows:
Pr(Partner is a Yes-Yes voter) + [.5+.5·.9]·Pr(Partner is a Yes-No voter) + .9·Pr(Partner is a No-No voter)
= 94.7 %. As a result, the expected probabilities with which Yes-Yes voters will receive the information
At-Least are 75.0 % in their democratic groups under the treatment condition, and 73.7 % in their
undemocratic groups under the treatment condition or under the control condition. These two are almost
the same to each other. Here, these two probabilities were calculated as follows:




We note that as an anonymous referee pointed out, having this information feedback
alone is not enough to fully control for signaling effects inmeasuring the ‘direct’ effect
of democracy even though thequantity of the informationAt-Least is balancedbetween
the “Dem Imp” and “Comp Imp” conditions. This is because subjects are not informed
of the exact probability that the sanction policy is imposed in case of a tie in democratic
groups. We discuss the details of the signaling effect and explore the relative strength
of it compared with the direct effect of democracy in Sect. 4. By contrast, we are
able to identify the ‘spill-over’ effect of democracy while fully controlling for the
size of signaling effects if the quantity of the information At-Least is balanced. This
is because we measure the difference in contribution amount between the treatment
subjects (who belong to “Dem Imp, Comp Imp”) and the control subjects (who belong
to “Comp Imp, Comp Imp”) in the same type of group—“Comp Imp” group. Before
conducting data analyses, we test whether the quantity of the information At-Least
is statistically balanced (a) between the treatment subjects in “Dem Imp” groups and
the control subjects in “Comp Imp” groups; and (b) between the treatment subjects in
“Comp Imp” groups and the control subjects in “Comp Imp” groups.10
2.2.3 The contribution stage
As discussed, a non-deterrent sanction policy may be imposed in each group in Period
2. The MPCR equals 0.6 in this period as well. When the policy is put in place, each
point that a subject allocates to her private account results in a fine of 0.3 points. In
other words, when subject i contributes Ci,k to her public account in her kth group
(k ∈ {1,2}), she obtains the following payoff (π2i,k):
π2i,k = (20 − Ci,k) · (1 − 0.3 · I{implement,k}) + 0.6 · (Ci,k + Ci ′ s partner,k), (2)
where I{implement,k} = 1 if the policy is implemented in the kth group; = 0 otherwise.
Ci ′ spartner,k is the contribution amount of subject i’s interaction counterpart in her kth
group. The total payoff of subject i in this period are the sum of her payoffs in her two
assigned groups (π2i =
∑2
k=1 π2i,k).
We note that treatment subjects simultaneously belong to a democratic group and
an undemocratic group. These two groups are different from each other even if the
same policy is implemented in each group, because the implementation process is
different in each group. In this contribution stage, subjects have reminders of what
determined the scheme in each of their two assigned groups and how the vote went in
Footnote 9 continued
= Pr(“Dem Imp, Comp Imp” and the Yes−Yes voter receives the info. At−Least in her democratic group)
Pr (“Dem Imp, Comp Imp” and a decision−maker is a Yes−Yes voter)
= (.9 · {.423 + (.5 + .5 · .9 · .5) · .10 + .9 · .5 · .477})/{.9 · .947} ≈ 75.0 %.
(b) Pr(a Yes-Yes voter receives info. At-Least in her “Comp Imp” group under “Dem Imp, Comp Imp”
|“Dem Imp, Comp Imp” and a decision-maker is a Yes-Yes voter) = Pr(a Yes-Yes voter receives info.
At-Least in her “Comp Imp” group under “Comp Imp, Comp Imp” |“Comp Imp, Comp Imp” and a
decision-maker is a Yes-Yes voter) = Pr(a Yes-Yes voter receives Info. At-Least in the “Comp Imp” group)
= .423+.5·.10+.5·.5·.10+.5·.47.7 ≈ 73.7 %.
10 The quantity of the information At-Least was in fact statistically balanced between the two kinds of
groups in the experiment (see Sect. 3). This was expected as explained in footnote 9.
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each group on their computer screens to avoid confusion (see Appendix Fig. B.1 for
examples of reminders on the screen).
2.2.4 Some discussions concerning predictions
Regardless of whether the sanction policy is imposed in Period 2, contributing nothing
to the public account is the strictly dominant strategy for a subject under the assumption
that the subject is selfish. This is because the policy is sufficientlyweak: 1.0−0.3 > 0.6
[see Eq. (2)]. As a result, allocating all points to her private account is the unique
Nash equilibrium (NE) for material payoff maximizers, although contributing the
full endowment to the public account is the social optimum. Therefore, the sanction
policy, if imposed, will cause her to pay a maximum fine of 6 points (= 0.3 × 20).
Each subject’s vote is pivotal in each group as the group size is two. Thus, the standard
theory predicts that each subject will vote against the policy in both of her two assigned
groups (Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium). Appendix Fig. B.2 includes the game
tree of the experiment.
Subjects may, however, vote for the policy and then voluntarily contribute to that
group when the policy is selected. This is because, first of all, the sanction policy
reduces the temptation to defect. If some subjects are not self-interested and instead
have other-regarding preferences, such as reciprocity (e.g., Rabin 1993) and income
inequality aversion (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999), mutual cooperation would become
more easily achieved as an equilibrium with help of the non-deterrent sanction policy.
Second, voting in favor of the sanction policy could be considered a credible way of
signaling an intention to cooperate, since each subject knows that their votes will be
informed to their partners by the information feedback rule.
Subjects’ compliance or contribution decisions with the sanction policy might dif-
fer by how a policy is imposed as in other related studies. If experiencing a successful
democratic imposition of the policy affects subjects’ beliefs about their partners’ future
action choices or enhance their social preferences, subjects in the democratic group
may contribute more to that group, compared with the control subjects. Further, sub-
jects’ responses to the successful endogenous imposition may differ by voter type.
For instance, suppose that subjects have reciprocal preferences. Then, Yes-Yes voters
may exhibit positive reciprocity for the outcome that the policy was imposed reflecting
their votes. Such reciprocity is absent in the undemocratic condition as the computer
stochastically imposes a policy in that condition. If reciprocity plays a role, we may
find positive direct effects of democracy for Yes-Yes voters.
As discussed in Sect. 1, moreover, the spill-over or transfer of institutional effects,
or income inequality-averse preference models can predict the presence of positive
spill-over effects of democracy if the direct effect of democracy is present.
3 Results
A total of three hundred undergraduate students at Brown University participated in
the experiment in April and May, 2010. 15 sessions were conducted in a computer
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laboratory at Brown University.11 No subject participated in more than one session.
The sessions lasted around one hour on average. Subjects were privately paid at the
end of the experiment. The average earnings were $21.38 (including a $5 participation
fee) with a standard deviation of $5.04. The instructions for the experiment were
neutrally framed. The instructionswere read aloud by the experimenter to subjects. The
experiment was programmed in z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). Communication between
subjects was not permitted during sessions.
The average contribution in Period 1 was 5.96 points, with a standard deviation
of 6.06 points. Contributing 30 % of the endowment in a one-shot experiment is
not unusual. This is near the lower end of the range that is predicted from previous
experiments in the literature, given the lower efficiency of the group optimum (see
Ledyard 1995 and Zelmer 2003).
Out of the 300 subjects, around 42 % of them voted for the non-deterrent policy in
both of their twoassignedgroups, 48%voted against the policy in both of their assigned
groups, and only 10 % of them voted differently in their two groups (Appendix Table
B.1). Considering this distribution, we focus on measuring the effects of democracy
on the Yes-Yes and No-No voters only. As a result of the subjects’ votes and the
computer’s stochastic decisions, 120 subjects were faced with the treatment condition
(“Dem Imp, Comp Imp”) and 76 were faced with the control condition (“Comp Imp,
Comp Imp”) in Period 2. Of the 120 treatment subjects, 67 were Yes-Yes voters and
37 were No-No voters. Of the 76 control subjects, 31 were Yes-Yes voters and 37 were
No-No voters (Appendix Table B.2).
3.1 The direct and spill-over effects of democracy
In the experiment, all subjects received either the information At-Least or the infor-
mation At-Most, regardless of whether they belonged to a democratic group or an
undemocratic group. The fractions of subjects that received the information At-Least
were statistically balanced between the democratic and undemocratic conditions for
each voter type.12 Thus, we can measure the direct effect of democracy while con-
trolling for signaling effects to a large degree. The spill-over effect of democracy can
be measured with signaling effects fully controlling for. We identify the two kinds of
11 Participants were recruited from the general student population there, using the Brown University Social
Science Experiment Lab (BUSSEL) on-line recruitment system. 46 out of the 300 subjects listed economics
as one of their concentrations. This fraction was similar to the proportion of economics majors in the
university’s undergraduate population. Other participants came from fields ranging from the humanities
to the sciences. The number of participants per session was 21, 18 or 15. All subjects were first-time
participants in public goods game experiments.
12 In the treatment condition (“Dem Imp,Comp Imp”), out of the 67Yes-Yes voters, 77.6%of them received
the information At-Least in their democratic groups and 71.6% received it in their undemocratic groups. By
contrast, in the control condition (“Comp Imp, Comp Imp”), out of the 37 Yes-Yes voters, they received it in
66.1% of the cases. The ratios, 77.6, 71.6 and 66.1% are not statistically significant according to two-sided,
two-sample tests of proportions. Similar holds also for No-No voters. In the treatment condition, out of the
37 No-No voters, 37.8 % of them received the information At-Least in their democratic groups and 21.6 %
received it in their undemocratic groups. By contrast, in the control condition, No-No voters received it in
28.4 % of the cases. The ratios, 37.8, 21.6, and 28.4% are not statistically different. See Appendix Table
B.4 and footnote 9 also.
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democracy premiums for each voter type.13 The direct effect of democracy is identified
by comparing (a) the contribution amounts in the democratic groups in the treatment
condition (“Dem Imp, Comp Imp”) and (b) the contribution amounts in the unde-
mocratic groups in the control condition (“Comp Imp, Comp Imp”). The spill-over
effect of democracy is identified by comparing (c) the contribution amounts in the
undemocratic groups in the treatment condition and (b) mentioned above (See Fig. 2
also).14
3.1.1 The effects of democracy on yes-yes voters
The contribution amounts by the supporters of the non-deterrent sanction substan-
tially differ by their experience of the democratic process. Yes-Yes voters on average
contributed 16.55 points to their democratic groups and 15.73 points to their unde-
mocratic groups in the treatment condition (Table 1). This is in sharp contrast with
Yes-Yes voters in the control condition: they contributedmuch smaller amounts, 12.05
points on average, to their undemocratic groups. Thus, the direct effect of democracy
is 4.5 points (=16.55−12.05), which is 22.5% of the endowment. The spill-over effect
of democracy is 3.7 points (=15.73 − 12.05), which is 18.4 % of the endowment. A
regression analysis, shown in column (1) and (5) of Tables 2 and 3, finds that both
the direct and spill-over effects of democracy are significant at the 1 and 5 % level,
respectively.15 The sizes of the direct effect and of the spill-over effect decrease to
3.35 points and 3.05 points, which are reductions of 25.5 and 17.7 % respectively, if
control variables are added, as shown in columns (2) and (6), but these are significant
at the 10 % level. The size of the direct effect of democracy is greater than that of the
spill-over effect of democracy.16
The effects of democracy can alternatively be measured by the use of the median.
As shown in columns (3), (4), (7) and (8), both the direct and spill-over effects are
significant at the 1 or 5 % level, regardless of whether control variables are included
or not.
13 In the working paper version of this paper, we also explored how the effects of democracy differ by
gender or by cooperative disposition, finding that the effects of democracy we find for those who support
the policy are driven by the male subjects. We also find that the size of the effects of democracy differ by
subject’s cooperative disposition. See Kamei (2014) for the details.
14 We use regression methods to identify the two democracy premiums as it enables us to include control
variables for robustness check. We acknowledge that non-parametric tests are equally important; we report
Mann-Whitney test results in footnotes 15 and 20. As explained later, our findings are robust.
15 The average contribution of 16.55 points in the treatment condition and 12.05 points in the control
condition are significantly different according to an individual-level Mann–Whitney test (p value = .0051,
two-tailed), so are 15.73 points and 12.05 points (p value = .018, two-tailed). The regression models in
Tables 2 and 3 (and Tables 4, 5) were estimated separately for each of the direct and spill-over effects
of democracy. This is because including contribution amounts both in their democratic and undemocratic
groups along with two dummy variables in a single equation to measure the direct and spill-over effects
requires clustering standard errors by individual ID. However, the finite sample bias of clustering is known
to be greater when the size of clusters is small.
16 They are significantly different at the 10% level if we use one-tailedWilcoxon signed ranks test (p value
= 0.080). This is suggestive evidence of the treatment subjects discriminating their contribution behaviors
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Our result that Yes-Yes voters raise their level of cooperation significantly respond-
ing to a democratically imposed non-deterrent policy, compared with Yes-Yes voters
under the control, is consistent with recent work by Dal Bó et al. (2010) and Tyran
and Feld (2006).17 The results of ours and these previous studies resonate with the
idea that the supporters of a policy exhibit a strong motivation crowding-in effect or
strong positive reciprocity to the collective outcome that a policy is democratically
imposed reflecting their approving votes. The result that the supporters of the sanc-
tion in the treatment condition raise their compliance even with an undemocratically
imposed sanction rule implies that the impact may spill over to their behavior in a
second domain.18
Result 1: Yes-Yes voters exhibit the direct and spill-over effects of democracy.
The fractions of subjects that received the information At-Least were statistically
balanced between democratic groups and undemocratic groups for each voter type.
However, as an anonymous referee pointed out, I acknowledge that the equal distribu-
tions of information do not assure that subjects have the same posterior beliefs between
the “Dem Imp” condition and “Comp Imp” condition. More specifically, Yes-Yes vot-
ers’ posterior beliefs on their partner’s voter type when they received the information
At-Least depend on whether they were in the “Dem Imp” condition or “Comp Imp”
condition. Thus, the result on the direct effect of democracy in Result 1 may not be
clean. This happens due to the fact that the non-deterrent sanction policy was imposed
with a probability of 90 % in case of a tie under the “Dem Imp” condition, but sub-
jects were not informed of the exact probability. In the remaining of Sect. 3.1.1, we
explain why this design piece can lead to a difference in subjects’ posterior belief.
We then show that our results on the direct effect in Result 1 are not attributable to
signaling effects. We note that Yes-Yes voters who received the information At-Most
are fully comparable between the “Dem Imp” and “Comp Imp” conditions because
Yes-Yes voters’ posterior beliefs that opponents are also Yes-Yes voters are 0 with the
information At-Most in both of the conditions.
On the one hand, the posterior belief that a Yes-Yes subject forms in the “Dem
Imp” group depends on her prior belief that her partner is a Yes-Yes voter (which
we denote as pprior ), which information she receives (At-Most or At-Least), and the
probability that the computer imposes the non-deterrent sanction in case of a tie. We
use γ ∈ [0, 1] to express the probability that the computer imposes it in case of a
tie. Then, according to the Bayes Rule, the Yes-Yes voter believes that her opponent
17 Dal Bó et al. (2010) shows that when a prisoner’s dilemma game is democratically changed to a coor-
dination game where the mutual cooperation is also an equilibrium, the supporters of the modification
cooperate significantly more. Tyran and Feld (2006) show the possibility of a significant democratic effect
in the case of a lump-sum non-deterrent fine in a social dilemma.
18 A reader may pose the possibility that some subjects were confused about what determined the scheme
in each of their two assigned groups in the contribution stage. However, this is very unlikely since the
Footnote 18 continued
voting stage proceeded separately in each of their two assigned groups. In addition, in the contribution
stage subjects received reminders about implementation outcomes, including what determined the scheme
in each of their two assigned groups (the computer or their votes), on their computer screens (see Sect. 2.2.3
and Appendix Fig. B.1).
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is also a Yes-Yes voter with a probability of pposteriorDem Imp = p
prior
pprior+0.5·γ b·(1−pprior ) if
she receives the information At-Least. Here, γ b is her belief on γ. On the other hand,
the posterior belief that a Yes-Yes voter forms in the “Comp Imp” group depends
on his prior belief and which information he receives (At-Most or At-Least) only.
The Yes-Yes voter’s posterior belief that his opponent is also a Yes-Yes voter is:
pposteriorComp Imp = p
prior
pprior+0.5·(1−pprior ) if he receives the information At-Least. We see that
unless γb = 1, pposteriorDem Imp > p
posterior
Comp Imp. In the experiment, γ = .9, which is close to
1.0; however, the value of γ is not known to subjects. Therefore, subjects’ beliefs on γ
are not equal to .9. We can assume that subjects believe, for example, that the sanction
policy would be imposed with a probability of 50 % (i.e., γ = .5 < .9), which makes
pposteriorDem Imp larger. In other words, signaling effects can be theoretically stronger under
the “Dem Imp” groups than under the “Comp Imp” groups, and thus contribution
amounts made in the “Dem Imp” groups may be overestimated.
In order to formally study how Yes-Yes voters’ contribution behaviors are affected
by posterior beliefs, we conduct a regression analysis in which the dependent variable
is subject i’s contribution amount in her democratic group in the treatment condition
(“Dem Imp, Comp Imp”). The independent variables include the InformationAt-Least
dummy variable (which equals 1 if i receives the information At-Least; 0 otherwise).
With this regression analysis, we can gauge the effect of having the information At-
Least, instead of the information At-Most, on the treatment subjects’ action choices
in the “Dem Imp” groups. As shown in Appendix Table B.6, we find that the informa-
tion At-Least dummy fails to obtain a significant coefficient. This means that signaling
effects are not themain forces that driveResult 1 concerning the direct effect of democ-
racy.We note that it is well-known that signaling effects are usually important channels
that boost cooperation (e.g., Tyran and Feld 2006). A likely reason that the information
At-Least dummy does not obtain a significant coefficient is that Yes-Yes voters con-
tributed very large amounts even when they received the Information ‘At-Most’ (with
which pposteriorDem Imp = 0) in our context (See Table B.4). This suggests that the direct
effect of democracy was indeed strong and there was no room for a further increase
in contribution by having additional positive signaling effects in the experiment.
We lastly note that the ‘spill-over’ effect of democracy in Result 1 was identified
while signaling effects were fully controlled for since the quantity of the information
At-Last in the “Comp Imp” groups was sufficiently balanced between Yes-Yes voters
in the treatment and control conditions. The posterior beliefs of the treatment and con-
trol subjects are both given by pposteriorComp Imp = p
prior
pprior+0.5 · (1−pprior ) mentioned above.
19
It should also be noted that for each Yes-Yes voter in the treatment condition, a partner
in the “Comp Imp” groupwas different from her other partner in the “Dem Imp” group.
19 We ran regressions where the dependent variable is Yes-Yes voters’ contribution amounts under the
“Comp Imp” group in the treatment condition (“Dem Imp, Comp Imp”) condition nevertheless. As is
similar to the regression result for the direct effect part, we find that Yes-Yes voters’ action choices were
little affected by which information (the information At-Least or At-Most) they received. This results from
the finding that the democracy spill-over is indeed strong and the treatment subjects contributed very large
amounts in the “Comp Imp” groupswithout any help of signaling effects (i.e., with receiving the information
At-Most). See columns (3) and (4) of Appendix Table B.6.
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3.1.2 The effects of democracy on no-no voters
The impacts of democracy onNo-No voters are different from those onYes-Yes voters.
On the one hand, the opponents of the non-deterrent sanction policy in the treatment
condition on average contributed 7.35 points in their democratic groups and 7.65 points
in their undemocratic groups. On the other hand, No-No voters in the control condition
on average contributed 5.84 points in their undemocratic groups (Table 1). The direct
effect of democracy, 1.51 points on average (=7.35 − 5.84), and the spill-over effect
of democracy, 1.81 points on average (=7.65 − 5.84), are both insignificant (Tables
4, 5).20 Results are similar when the median contribution is used to gauge the direct
or spill-over effect on No-No voters.
The result that the opponents of the policy exhibit neither the direct nor spill-over
effect of democracy is similar to the result in Dal Bó et al. (2010).
Result 2: No-No voters do not exhibit either the direct or spill-over effect of democracy.
4 Conclusion
This paper provides the first evidence that a successful democratic imposition of a
policy may generate not only a direct effect, but also a spill-over effect on behaviors
of those who are involved in the democratic policy selection. When the subjects who
democratically changed the payoff structure in one group are placed in other groups in
which the change was imposed undemocratically, they contributed significantly more
than those who have never undergone the democratic change. Moreover, our data finds
that these positive democracy premiums were limited for those assenting to the policy;
the effects were not seen in those who voted against it.
Our findings have broad implications for economic policy, organization economics,
and political economy. When a policy is democratically implemented reflecting peo-
ple’s votes, the extra effects of a democratically implemented policy (i.e., democracy
premiums) may not be limited to the relevant social dilemma, but may also emerge
in another social dilemma through resilient behavioral responses of those assenting to
the policy. Such a spill-over effect may be substantial even if the policy is sufficiently
weak as in the non-deterrent policy in this study.
As afinal remark,wenote that the result on the spill-over effect has amethodological
implication in identifying the effects of a policy or democracy premiums.We have two
potential methods to measure such effects, whether experiments or empirical studies.
Thefirstmethod is to let each subject play games both in the treatment condition and the
control condition, and then to compare their behaviors between the two conditions. The
second method is, by contrast, to divide subjects into two kinds of groups: treatment
groups and control groups, let them play the games only in one assigned condition and
compare behaviors between the two kinds of groups. Which method should we use?
Our results indicate that the firstmethodmaynot be accurate, due to the spill-over effect
20 The average contribution of 7.35 points in the treatment condition and 5.84 points in the control condition
are not significantly different according to an individual-levelMann-Whitney test (p value = .45, two-tailed),
nor are that of 7.65 points and 5.84 points (p value = .41, two-tailed).
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of democracy, and that employing the secondmethod may be a more conservative way
to measure the effects.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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